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Competition Between Auctions

Listed author(s):
  • Ernan Haruvy
  • Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc
  • Octavian Carare
  • James C. Cox
  • Eric A. Greenleaf
  • Wolfgang Jank
  • Sandy Jap
  • Young-Hoon Park
  • Michael H. Rothkopf

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.

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File URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2008-02.pdf
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Paper provided by Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series with number 2008-02.

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Length: 26
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2008-02
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