Procuring Commodities: First Price Sealed Bid or English Auction?
I use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the English auction (EA) and the first price sealed bid auction (FPA) when procuring a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are lower in the FPA than in the EA. Bids and prices in EA agree with game theoretic predictions while they donâ€™t in the FPA. To resolve these deviations found in the FPA, I consider a mixture model with three bidding rules: constant absolute mark-up, constant percentage mark-up, and strategic best response. A dynamic specification is estimated as a hidden Markov model. Initially about three quarters of the subjects are strategic bidders, but over time the number of strategic bidders falls to below sixty-five percent. There is a corresponding growth in those who bid a constant absolute mark-up above realized cost. This model provides an explanation of the dynamics of the mean and variance of price.
|Date of creation:||08 Feb 2009|
|Date of revision:||26 Apr 2010|
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