Risky procurement with an insider bidder
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Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011.
"The insider's curse,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
- Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005.
"Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions,"
2005-72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Boone, Jan & Goeree, Jacob K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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