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Ranking Statistical Experiments via the Linear Convex Order and the Lorenz Zonoid: Economic Applications

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  • Kailin Chen

Abstract

This paper introduces a novel ranking of statistical experiments, the linear-Blackwell (LB) order, which can equivalently be characterized by (i) the dispersion of the induced posterior and likelihood ratios in the sense of the linear convex order, (ii) the size of the Lorenz zonoid (the set of statewise expectation profiles), or (iii) the variability of the posterior mean. We apply the LB order to compare experiments in binary-action decision problems and in decision problems with quasi-concave payoffs, as analyzed by Kolotilin, Corrao, and Wolitzky (2025). We also use it to compare experiments in moral hazard problems, building on Holmstr\"om (1979) and Kim (1995), and in screening problems with ex post signals.

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  • Kailin Chen, 2025. "Ranking Statistical Experiments via the Linear Convex Order and the Lorenz Zonoid: Economic Applications," Papers 2502.06530, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2502.06530
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