Organizing data analytics
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- Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
strategic experimentation; Bayesian persuasion; tampering; organizational design; information technology; audit;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2024-01-01 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-DES-2024-01-01 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2024-01-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2024-01-01 (Information and Communication Technologies)
- NEP-MIC-2024-01-01 (Microeconomics)
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