Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12515
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Other versions of this item:
- Di Tillio, Alfredo & Ottaviani, Marco & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2016. "Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018.
"The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
- Matthias Dahm & Paula Gonzalez & Nicolas Porteiro, 2016. "The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules," Discussion Papers 2016-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Matthias Dahm & Paula González & Nicolás Porteiro, 2018. "The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules," Working Papers 18.09, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Paula Gonzalez & Nicolas Porteiro, 2016. "The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules," Discussion Papers 2016-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Weiss, Yair, 2019.
"Cheating with (recursive) models,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
14100, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler & Yair Weiss, 2019. "Cheating with (Recursive) Models," Papers 1911.01251, arXiv.org.
- Michel Abramowicz & Ariane Szafarz, 2019. "Ethics of Randomized Controlled Trials: Should Economists Care about Equipoise?," Working Papers CEB 19-017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Herresthal, C., 2017. "Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1712, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
- So, Tony, 2020. "Classroom experiments as a replication device," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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