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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

Author

Listed:
  • Anton Kolotilin

    () (School of Economics, UNSW Business School, UNSW)

  • Tymofiy Mylovanov

    () (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics)

  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk

    () (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow)

  • Ming Li

    () (Concordia University and CIREQ)

Abstract

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver’s report about his type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments. We also characterize the optimal persuasion mechanisms. In particular, if the density of the receiver’s type is log-concave, then the optimal persuasion mechanism reveals the state if and only if the state is below a threshold. We apply our results to the design of media censorship policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Discussion Papers 2016-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  • Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-21
    as

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    File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2016-21.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
    2. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," ESE Discussion Papers 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    3. John K.‐H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2012. "Aggregating the Single Crossing Property," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2333-2348, September.
    4. Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2008. "A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 699-728.
    5. Chun-Fang Chiang & Brian Knight, 2011. "Media Bias and Influence: Evidence from Newspaper Endorsements," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 795-820.
    6. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
    7. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian persuasion; information disclosure; information design; mechanism design without transfers; experiments; persuasion mechanisms; media;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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