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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

Listed author(s):
  • Anton Kolotilin

    ()

    (School of Economics, UNSW Business School, UNSW)

  • Tymofiy Mylovanov

    ()

    (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics)

  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk

    ()

    (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow)

  • Ming Li

    ()

    (Concordia University and CIREQ)

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver’s report about his type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments. We also characterize the optimal persuasion mechanisms. In particular, if the density of the receiver’s type is log-concave, then the optimal persuasion mechanism reveals the state if and only if the state is below a threshold. We apply our results to the design of media censorship policies.

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File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2016-21.pdf
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Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2016-21.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2016
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-21
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Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
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  1. Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  2. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," ESE Discussion Papers 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. John K.‐H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2012. "Aggregating the Single Crossing Property," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2333-2348, 09.
  4. Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2008. "A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 699-728.
  5. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  6. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
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