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Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability

  • Timothy Besley
  • Andrea Prat

It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in governmentaccountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government mayinfluence news content by maintaining a "cozy" relationship with the media. Thispaper develops a model of democratic politics in which media capture is endogenous.The model offers insights into the features of the media market that determine theability of the government to exercise such capture and hence to influence politicaloutcomes

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Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series with number 07.

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Date of creation: Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stipep:07
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp

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