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Ming Li

Personal Details

First Name:Ming
Middle Name:
Last Name:Li
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pli196
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://alcor.concordia.ca/~mingli

Affiliation

(60%) Department of Economics
Concordia University

Montréal, Canada
http://artsandscience1.concordia.ca/economics/

: (514) 848-3900
(514) 848-4536
1455, de Maisonneuve Blvd, Montréal, Québec, H3G 1M8
RePEc:edi:deconca (more details at EDIRC)

(40%) Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ)

Montréal, Canada
http://www.cireqmontreal.com/

: (514) 343-6557
(514) 343-7221
C.P. 6128, Succ. centre-ville, Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7
RePEc:edi:cdmtlca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2015. "Persuasive signalling," Working Papers 15003, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
  2. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2014. "Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 5014, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
  5. Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," MPRA Paper 10719, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2008.
  6. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
  7. Li, Ming, 2002. "Information collection in bargaining," MPRA Paper 11108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.

Articles

  1. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
  2. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
  3. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
  4. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
  5. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.
  6. Ming Li, 2008. "Two (talking) heads are not better than one," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(63), pages 1-8.
  7. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2014. "Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 5014, CESifo Group Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo Group Munich.

  2. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  3. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.

    Cited by:

    1. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.

  4. Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," MPRA Paper 10719, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    2. Elena Panova, 2011. "A Passion for Democracy," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-47, CIRANO.
    3. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Conrad, Peter & Bergey, Meredith R., 2014. "The impending globalization of ADHD: Notes on the expansion and growth of a medicalized disorder," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 31-43.
    5. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.

  5. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.

    Cited by:

    1. A.K.S. Chand, 2012. "Strategic Information Transmission with Budget Constraint," Working Papers 2012_19, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

  6. Li, Ming, 2002. "Information collection in bargaining," MPRA Paper 11108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Ming, 2002. "Information collection in bargaining," MPRA Paper 11108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.

Articles

  1. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.

    Cited by:

    1. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    2. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2015. "Careerist experts and political incorrectness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-18.
    3. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2015. "A dirty deed done dirt cheap: reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians," MPRA Paper 67031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2015. "Preselection and Expert Advice," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201524, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 37-53.
    6. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

  3. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 115-148, November.
    2. Chung, Jeahan & Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2018. "Cheap talk by multiple speakers in the presence of network externalities," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-9, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    3. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2016. "Cheap talk with an informed receiver," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 61-72, April.
    4. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
    5. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    6. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    7. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    8. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-01413908, HAL.

  4. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Ming Li, 2008. "Two (talking) heads are not better than one," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(63), pages 1-8.

    Cited by:

    1. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  7. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Rush Anthony & Smirnov Vladimir & Wait Andrew, 2010. "Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, August.
    2. Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 451-467, September.
    3. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezso, 2015. "Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
    5. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
    6. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 780-809, April.
    7. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2012. "A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 490-492.
    8. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    9. Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    11. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2013. "Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 314-320.
    12. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    13. Blume, Andreas, 2018. "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 132-155.
    14. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
    15. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    16. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    17. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    18. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    19. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    20. Patrick Hummel & John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2013. "A model of flops," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 585-609, December.
    21. Tobias Gesche, 2016. "De-biasing strategic communication," ECON - Working Papers 216, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2017.
    22. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    23. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.
    24. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
    25. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
    26. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk," Working Papers 24, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    27. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2018. "Starting Small to Communicate," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1805, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    28. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2012. "Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation," Working Papers 2012/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    29. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2008-10-21 2009-01-17
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2015-09-18 2015-09-26
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2008-10-21 2009-01-17
  4. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2004-11-22
  5. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2008-10-21
  6. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2015-09-18
  7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2015-09-26
  8. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2010-04-17
  9. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2004-11-22

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