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Ming Li

Personal Details

First Name:Ming
Middle Name:
Last Name:Li
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RePEc Short-ID:pli196
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://alcor.concordia.ca/~mingli

Affiliation

(60%) Department of Economics
Concordia University

Montréal, Canada
http://artsandscience1.concordia.ca/economics/

: (514) 848-3900
(514) 848-4536
1455, de Maisonneuve Blvd, Montréal, Québec, H3G 1M8
RePEc:edi:deconca (more details at EDIRC)

(40%) Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ)

Montréal, Canada
http://www.cireqmontreal.com/

: (514) 343-6557
(514) 343-7221
C.P. 6128, Succ. centre-ville, Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7
RePEc:edi:cdmtlca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  2. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2015. "Persuasive signalling," Working Papers 15003, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
  3. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2014. "Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 5014, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  5. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
  6. Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," MPRA Paper 10719, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2008.
  7. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
  8. Li, Ming, 2002. "Information collection in bargaining," MPRA Paper 11108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.

Articles

  1. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
  2. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
  3. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
  4. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
  5. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
  6. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.
  7. Ming Li, 2008. "Two (talking) heads are not better than one," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(63), pages 1-8.
  8. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.

    Cited by:

    1. Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
    3. Di Tillio, Alfredo & Ottaviani, Marco & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2016. "Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    5. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce I. Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2017. "Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 23273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-583, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    7. Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 2017.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2015. "Limited Capacity in Project Selection: Competition Through Evidence Production," Working Papers 1343, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    9. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2018. "Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 3-21, January.
    10. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    11. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    12. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2018. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 201802, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
    13. Artem Hulko & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Information Provision in a Sequential Search Setting," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.
    14. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
    15. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2017. "The Design and Price of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2049R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
    17. Artem Hulko & Mark Whitmeyer, 2017. "A Game of Random Variables," Papers 1712.08716, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2018.
    18. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2017. "Beeps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 31-53, January.
    19. Kolotilin, Anton, 2018. "Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    20. Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2018. "Information Nudges and Self Control," TSE Working Papers 18-914, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    21. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2016. "A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 597-601, May.
    22. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Resisting Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 07-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

  2. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2014. "Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 5014, CESifo Group Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo Group Munich.

  3. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Doukas, John A. & Mandal, Sonik, 2018. "CEO risk preferences and hedging decisions: A multiyear analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 131-153.

  4. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.

    Cited by:

    1. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.

  5. Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," MPRA Paper 10719, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    2. Elena Panova, 2011. "A Passion for Democracy," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-47, CIRANO.
    3. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    5. Conrad, Peter & Bergey, Meredith R., 2014. "The impending globalization of ADHD: Notes on the expansion and growth of a medicalized disorder," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 31-43.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.

  6. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.

    Cited by:

    1. A.K.S. Chand, 2012. "Strategic Information Transmission with Budget Constraint," Working Papers 2012_19, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

  7. Li, Ming, 2002. "Information collection in bargaining," MPRA Paper 11108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.

    Cited by:

    1. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.

Articles

  1. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.

    Cited by:

    1. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2014. "Careerist Experts and Political Incorrectness," ISER Discussion Paper 0894, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    3. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2015. "A dirty deed done dirt cheap: reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians," MPRA Paper 67031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2015. "Preselection and Expert Advice," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201524, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 37-53.
    6. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

  4. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    2. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
    3. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 115-148, November.
    5. Chung, Jeahan & Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2018. "Cheap talk by multiple speakers in the presence of network externalities," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-9, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    6. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    7. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
    8. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2018. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 67-107, August.
    9. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-01413908, HAL.

  5. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Ming Li, 2008. "Two (talking) heads are not better than one," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(63), pages 1-8.

    Cited by:

    1. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.

  8. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Rush Anthony & Smirnov Vladimir & Wait Andrew, 2010. "Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, August.
    2. Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 451-467, September.
    3. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    4. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication," TSE Working Papers 18-939, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Szalay, Dezsö & Deimen, Inga, 2016. "Information, Authority, And Smooth Communication In Organizations," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145668, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    8. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    9. Patrick Hummel & John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2013. "A model of flops," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 585-609, December.
    10. Tobias Gesche, 2016. "De-biasing strategic communication," ECON - Working Papers 216, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2017.
    11. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
    12. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    13. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
    14. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 780-809, April.
    15. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2012. "A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 490-492.
    16. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.
    17. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    18. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    19. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
    20. Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    22. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2013. "Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 314-320.
    23. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
    24. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    25. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk," Working Papers 24, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    26. Blume, Andreas, 2018. "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 132-155.
    27. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2018. "Starting Small to Communicate," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1805, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    28. Ole Jann, 2018. "Why Echo Chambers are Useful," Economics Series Working Papers 857, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    29. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
    30. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2012. "Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation," Working Papers 2012/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    31. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2015-09-18 2015-09-26 2017-03-12 2017-04-16
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2008-10-21 2009-01-17
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2008-10-21 2009-01-17
  4. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2004-11-22
  5. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2008-10-21
  6. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2015-09-18
  7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2015-09-26
  8. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2010-04-17
  9. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2004-11-22

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