IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Experimental Design to Persuade

  • Anton Kolotilin

    ()

    (School of Economics, the University of New South Wales)

A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. I show that the sender optimally discloses only whether the receivers utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the senders and receivers welfare to be monotonic in information. Most notably, the senders welfare increases with the precision of the senders potential information and decreases with the precision of public information.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2013-17.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2013-17.

as
in new window

Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-17
Contact details of provider: Postal: Australian School of Business Building, Sydney 2052
Phone: (+61)-2-9385-3380
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey, 2001. "The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems," Working Papers 01003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  3. Péter Eső & Bal�zs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  4. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers 2013-19, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
  6. Luis Rayo & Ilya Segal, 2010. "Optimal Information Disclosure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 949 - 987.
  7. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriele Gratton)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.