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Value of public information in sender–receiver games

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  • Chen, Ying

Abstract

I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:343-345
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Seidmann, Daniel J., 1990. "Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 445-458, April.
    2. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 143-161, January.
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    5. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, 2005. "Allocation of Decision-making Authority," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 353-383, September.
    6. Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2007. "A two-person game of information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 90-104, July.
    7. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
    3. Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023. "Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk," Papers 2302.00281, arXiv.org.
    4. Bijkerk, Suzanne H. & Karamychev, Vladimir & Swank, Otto H., 2018. "When words are not enough," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 294-314.
    5. Chulyoung Kim & Paul S. Koh, 2020. "Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 282-305, September.
    6. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
    7. Catonini, Emiliano & Stepanov, Sergey, 2023. "Reputation and information aggregation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 156-173.
    8. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    9. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 60-63.
    11. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    12. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
    13. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
    14. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    15. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
    16. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2018. "The strategist and the tactician," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 427-434.
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Value of information; Sender–receiver games; Cheap talk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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