Value of public information in sender–receiver games
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References listed on IDEAS
- Seidmann, Daniel J., 1990. "Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 445-458, April.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
- Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2016. "Cheap talk with an informed receiver," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 61-72, April.
- Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015.
"Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
- Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2014-04, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers hal-00973071, HAL.
- Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po publications 2014-04, Sciences Po.
- Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
- Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 60-63.
- Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
More about this item
KeywordsValue of information; Sender–receiver games; Cheap talk;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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