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Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design

  • Watson, Joel
  • Bull, Jesse

This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated intomechanismdesign analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of “evidentiary normality†and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt7973v805.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt7973v805
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  1. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2004. "On Optimal Rules of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1715-1736, November.
  2. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
  3. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact Finding," Working Papers 0612, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  4. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  5. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January.
  7. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  8. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Working Papers 0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  9. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July.
  10. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
  11. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
  12. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
  13. Evans, R., 2006. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0627, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  14. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
  15. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  16. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  18. Sandro Brusco, 2002. "Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 509-532, May.
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