Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163-170] results to games with partial provability.
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