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Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty

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  • Koessler, Frederic

Abstract

In persuasion games, it is well known that a perfectly revealing equilibrium may fail to exist when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party\'s payoff-relevant information. However, by explicitly integrating higher order uncertainty into the information structure, this paper shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff-relevant state space. On the contrary, when payoff-irrelevant disclosures are impossible, a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to exist as long as there is a strictly positive probability that the decision maker does not know whether the interested party is informed or not. In this case, a partially revealing equilibrium and associated inferences are characterized.
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Suggested Citation

  • Koessler, Frederic, 2003. "Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 393-399, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:110:y:2003:i:2:p:393-399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47.
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    3. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    4. Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(3), pages 453-467, November.
    5. Hart, Sergiu & Heifetz, Aviad & Samet, Dov, 1996. ""Knowing Whether," "Knowing That," and The Cardinality of State Spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 249-256, July.
    6. H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 58-71, Spring.
    7. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
    8. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-334, May.
    9. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
    2. Mathis, Jérôme, 2008. "Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 571-584, November.
    3. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    4. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
    5. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
    6. Deborah Wilson, 2005. "Acquisition and disclosure of genetic information under alternative policy regimes," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/118, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    7. T. Lanzi & J. Mathis, 2004. "Argumentation in Sender-Receiver Games," THEMA Working Papers 2004-19, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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