Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
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Other versions of this item:
- Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(3), pages 453-467, November.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007.
"Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
- Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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1613, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
- Yasushi Asako & Yukihiko Funaki & Kozo Ueda & Nobuyuki Uto, 2017. "Symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence," CAMA Working Papers 2017-05, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Asako, Yasushi & Funaki, Yukihiko & Ueda, Kozo & Uto, Nobuyuki, 2017. "(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 312, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Amil Dasgupta & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000368, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003.
"Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1406, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Franklin Allen & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm346, Yale School of Management.
- Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000553, www.najecon.org.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008.
"Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
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- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Post-Print halshs-00754297, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Koessler, Frederic, 2003. "Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 393-399, June.
- John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, EconWPA.
- Moinas, Sophie & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "The Bubble Game : An experimental Study of Speculation (An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title "The Rational and Irrational Bubbles : an Experiment")," IDEI Working Papers 560, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2012.
- JÃ³zsef SÃ¡kovics, 2001.
"Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 347-366, June.
- Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors," ESE Discussion Papers 77, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- John R. Conlon, 2015.
"Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 141-161, February.
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- repec:eee:macchp:v2-1065 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rafiqul Bhuyan, 2002. "Information, Alternative Markets, and Security Price Processes: A Survey of Literature," Finance 0211002, EconWPA.
- Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 03-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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