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Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets

  • Franklin Allen
  • Stephen Morris
  • Hyun Song Shin

In a financial market where traders are risk averse and short lived, and prices are noisy, asset prices today depend on the average expectation today of tomorrow's price. Thus (iterating this relationship) the date 1 price equals the date 1 average expectation of the date 2 average expectation of the date 3 price. This will not in general equal the date 1 average expectation of the date 3 price. We show how this failure of the law of iterated expectations for average belief can help understand the role of higher order beliefs in a fully rational asset pricing model and explain over-reaction to (noisy) public information.

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Paper provided by www.najecon.org in its series NajEcon Working Paper Reviews with number 391749000000000553.

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Date of creation: 17 Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000553
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  1. Harrison, J Michael & Kreps, David M, 1978. "Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 323-36, May.
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  8. Markus K Brunnermeier, 2002. "Bubbles and Crashes," FMG Discussion Papers dp401, Financial Markets Group.
  9. James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1993. "Arbitrage Chains," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0035, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
  10. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July.
  11. Allen, Franklin & Gorton, Gary, 1993. "Churning Bubbles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 813-36, October.
  12. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  13. J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1989. "Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation," NBER Working Papers 2880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Wang, Jiang, 1994. "A Model of Competitive Stock Trading Volume," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 127-68, February.
  15. Joseph G. Pearlman & Thomas J. Sargent, 2005. "Knowing the Forecasts of Others," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 480-497, April.
  16. Christian Hellwig, 2002. "Public Announcements, Adjustment Delays, and the Business Cycle (November 2002)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 208, UCLA Department of Economics.
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  20. Brunnermeier, Markus K., 2001. "Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198296980, March.
  21. Diamond, Douglas W. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1981. "Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 221-235, September.
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  23. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (Reprint 042)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 16-92, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  24. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharftstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1992. " Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1461-84, September.
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  26. Michael Woodford, 2001. "Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Hyun Song Shin & Andrew Postlewaite & Stephen Morris, 1995. "Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 453-467.
  28. Biais, Bruno & Bossaerts, Peter, 1998. "Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 307-40, April.
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