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Coarse Thinking and Persuasion

  • Shleifer, Andrei
  • Mullainathan, Sendhil
  • Schwartzstein, Joshua

We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarselyâ€: they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category. Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals' choice of category. The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising.

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File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11022284/coarse%20thinking%20and%20persuasion.pdf
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Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 11022284.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:11022284
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