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Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

  • Forges, Francoise
  • Koessler, Frederic

This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players' types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (2005)
Issue (Month): 7 (November)
Pages: 793-811

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:7:p:793-811
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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