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A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

  • Blume, Andreas

This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford–Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the ϵ-noise model of Blume et al. (2007), including outcomes with an uncountable infinity of equilibrium actions, can be obtained via strategy-correlated equilibria of the noise-free game. The occasional mismatch between the encoding and decoding rules used by sender and receiver in a strategy-correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as uncertainty about language use.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000486
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 510-517

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:510-517
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  2. FORGES, Françoise, . "Equilibria with communication in a job market example," CORE Discussion Papers RP -885, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Forges, F., 1987. "Can sunspots replace a mediator ?," CORE Discussion Papers 1987045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
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  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
  9. FORGES, Françoise, . "Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  11. Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June.
  12. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  13. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board, 2009. "Intentional Vagueness," Working Papers 381, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2009.
  14. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  15. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  16. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
  17. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
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