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Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment

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  • Roland Strausz

    ()

    (Free University of Berlin, Department of Economics)

  • Kay Mitusch

Abstract

We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when a principal needs information from an agent to implement an action. Assuming a strong form of limited commitment, the principal may employ a mediator who gathers information and makes non--binding proposals. We show that a partial revelation of information is more effective through a mediator than through the agent himself. This implies that mediation is strictly helpful if and only if the likelihood of a conflict of interest is positive but not too high. The value of mediation depends non--monotonically on the degree of conflict. Our insights extend to general models of contracting with imperfect commitment.

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Paper provided by Departmental Working Papers in its series Papers with number 023.

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Handle: RePEc:bef:lsbest:023
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Keywords: Mediation; Negotiation; Limited Commitment; Revelation Principle;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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Cited by:

  1. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  3. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
  4. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
  6. Krahmer, Daniel, 2006. "Message-contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 490-506, August.
  7. Doornik, Katherine, 2014. "A rationale for mediation and its optimal use," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-10.
  8. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.

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