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Can sunspots replace a mediator ?

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  • FORGES, F.

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  • Forges, F., 1987. "Can sunspots replace a mediator ?," CORE Discussion Papers 1987045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1987045
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    2. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1990. "Can Strategic Bargaining Models Explain Collective Bargaining Data?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 405-409, May.
    3. David Card, 1990. "Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 625-659.
    4. Gretlein, Rodney & Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 1996. "To fight or not to fight? That is the question," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 85-114.
    5. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    9. Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43.
    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:04:p:943-957_23 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    2. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Giraud, Gael & Rochon, Celine, 2002. "Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 441-463, December.
    5. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    6. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    7. Polemarchakis, Herakles M. & Ray, Indrajit, 2006. "Sunspots, correlation and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 174-184.
    8. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers.
    9. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8159 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October.
    12. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
    13. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.

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