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Long Cheap Talk

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Robert J. Aumann

    ()

  • Sergiu Hart

    ()

Abstract

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

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File URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/long.pdf
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Paper provided by The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp284.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2002
Date of revision: Nov 2002
Publication status: Published in Econometrica, 2003, vol. 71, pp. 1619-1660.
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284
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Keywords: cheap talk; communication; long conversation; incomplete information; game theory; signalling; joint lottery; dimartingale; di-span;

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  1. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.
  2. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
  3. Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel, 1996. "Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-25, January.
  4. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
  5. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
  6. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-1364, November.
  7. repec:cor:louvrp:-636 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
  9. Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
  10. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
  11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  12. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
  13. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
  14. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  15. Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2007. "A two-person game of information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 90-104, July.
  16. Blume Andreas & Sobel Joel, 1995. "Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 359-382, April.
  17. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
  18. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
  19. Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636, December.
    • Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206, November.
  20. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  21. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  22. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
  23. Zapater, Inigo, 1997. "Credible Proposals in Communication Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 173-197, January.
  24. Françoise Forges, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-398.
  25. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July.
  26. repec:dau:papers:123456789/184 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  28. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  29. Simon, Robert Samuel, 2002. "Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 79-102, October.
  30. Sergiu Hart, 1985. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 117-153, February.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. “Long Cheap Talk,” R. Aumann & S. Hart (2003)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2013-02-11 10:49:00
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