Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Simon, Robert Samuel, 2017. "An improvement on the existence proof of joint plan equilibria," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 261, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Renault, J., 1997. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals," Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications 97.72, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
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- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
- Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008.
"Long persuasion games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
- Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
- Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016.
"Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 11-36, March.
- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Working Papers hal-01094061, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2015. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-01252950, HAL.
- R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," ESE Discussion Papers 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- repec:eee:mateco:v:76:y:2018:i:c:p:52-61 is not listed on IDEAS
- Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2017. "Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 17, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
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