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Strategic Information Exchange

Author

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  • Rosenberg, Dinah

    ()

  • Solan, Eilon

    ()

  • Vieille , Nicolas

    ()

Abstract

We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In effect, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one’s initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:1009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    3. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
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    6. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, March.
    7. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    8. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2004. "A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 88-103, January.
    9. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 975-1000.
    10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    11. Françoise Forges, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-398.
    12. Peski, Marcin, 2008. "Repeated games with incomplete information on one side," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
    13. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:318-329 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Johannes Hörner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Selling Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(6), pages 1515-1562.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic Information Exchange; incomplete information; independent decision problems; equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General

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