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Strategic Information Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Rosenberg, Dinah
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Vieille , Nicolas

Abstract

We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In effect, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one’s initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:1009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2018. "To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 318-329.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic Information Exchange; incomplete information; independent decision problems; equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General

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