IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v18y1997i2p159-175.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Author

Listed:
  • Forges, Francoise
  • Minelli, Enrico

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:159-175
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(97)90537-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.
    2. Françoise Forges, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-398.
    3. Shalev Jonathan, 1994. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 246-259, September.
    4. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(2), pages 177-188.
    5. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 388-406, August.
    6. Zamir, Shmuel, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 109-154 Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    3. E. Minelli & H. Polemarchakis, 2003. "Information at equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 573-584, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:159-175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.