Information at equilibrium
In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals: their elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and their acts are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation.
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982.
"We can't disagree forever,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
- Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-678, May.
- MINELLI, Enrico & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1993. "Knowledge at Equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1993054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kreps, David M., 1977. "A note on "fulfilled expectations" equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-43, February.
- F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996.
"Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations,"
THEMA Working Papers
96-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 388-406, August.
- Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers 9605, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico, 1994. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994044, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gerard Debreu, 1959. "Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 76, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey, 1979.
"Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge,"
377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997.
"A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
- Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2000004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.