IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Information at equilibrium

  • MINELLI, Enrico
  • POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals: their elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and their acts are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/a0cabffb-f8d7-43d4-9fe6-d27a215335b7/coredp_2000_04.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2000004.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2000004
Contact details of provider: Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-78, May.
  2. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
  3. MINELLI, Enrico & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1993. "Knowledge at Equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1993054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Gerard Debreu, 1959. "Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 76, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
  6. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico, 1994. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994044, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 639, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Kreps, David M., 1977. "A note on "fulfilled expectations" equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-43, February.
  9. Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2000004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.