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Knowledge at Equilibrium

Author

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  • MINELLI, Enrico
  • POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles

Abstract

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies information is essentially symemetric when the same profile is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information. We show that, at a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric, and their strategies are common knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • MINELLI, Enrico & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1993. "Knowledge at Equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1993054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1993054
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1993.html
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. E. Minelli & H. Polemarchakis, 2003. "Information at equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 573-584, March.
    2. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 388-406, August.
    3. Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Justifying Rational Expectations''," CARESS Working Papres 95-04, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    4. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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