Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum
In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
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- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric, 2013.
"Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 103-120.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00773412, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00565157, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Post-Print halshs-00565157, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Post-Print halshs-00773412, HAL.
- Vieille, Nicolas, 2002.
"Stochastic games: Recent results,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 48, pages 1833-1850,
Elsevier.
- Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "Stochastic Games: recent results," Working Papers hal-00596229, HAL.
- VIEILLE, Nicolas, 2001. "Stochastic games : recent results," HEC Research Papers Series 743, HEC Paris.
- Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games : recent results," Working Papers hal-00242996, HAL.
- Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2007.
"War and Peace,"
Chapters, in: Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed.), Augustin Cournot: Modelling Economics, chapter 5,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2005. "War and Peace," Discussion Paper Series dp428, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Aumann, Robert J., 2005. "War and Peace," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-4, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics.
- VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2002.
"Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information,"
HEC Research Papers Series
754, HEC Paris.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg, 2004. "Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information," Post-Print hal-00464938, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information," Working Papers hal-00593394, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1346, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998.
"Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
- Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996. "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," THEMA Working Papers 96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2001. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Fabien Gensbittel & Jérôme Renault, 2015. "The Value of Markov Chain Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 820-841, October.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013.
"Strategic information exchange,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
- Jérôme Renault, 2000. "On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(4), pages 552-572, November.
- Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Jérôme Renault, 2012. "The Value of Repeated Games with an Informed Controller," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 154-179, February.
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997.
"A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
- Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Jimenez, Edward & Moya, Douglas, 2005. "Econophysics: from Game Theory and Information Theory to Quantum Mechanics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 348(C), pages 505-543.
- Marina Sandomirskaia, 2017. "Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(01), pages 1-7, March.
- Abraham Neyman, 2012.
"The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 195-207, February.
- Abraham Neyman, 2009. "The Value Of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration," Discussion Paper Series dp512, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.
- Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2018.
"On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values,"
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 180-198, March.
- Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2016. "On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values," HSE Working papers WP BRP 148/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- M. K. Ghosh & D. McDonald & S. Sinha, 2004. "Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Partial Information," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-118, April.
- Rida Laraki, 2010. "Explicit formulas for repeated games with absorbing states," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 53-69, March.
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JEL classification:
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
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