Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage games share the same simple structure, but differ markedly on how information should be optimally used once they are repeated. Despite the complexity of the optimal strategies, the empirical value of information coincides with the theoretical prediction in most instances. In particular, it is never negative, it decreases with the number of repetitions, and it is nicely bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game and above by the value of the one-shot game. Subjects are unable to completely ignore their information when it is optimal to do so, but the use of information in the lab reacts qualitatively well to the type and length of the game being played
|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital 75 647 PARIS CEDEX 13|
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert J. Aumann & Jacques H. Dreze, 2008.
"Rational Expectations in Games,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 72-86, March.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008.
"Long persuasion games,"
- Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
- Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- John Wooders, 2010. "Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1143-1154, 05.
- S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010.
"A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
572, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Folk Theorem with Communication,"
784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
- George Loewenstein & Don Moore & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(3), pages 281-295, September.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2001.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
ESE Discussion Papers
76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, EconWPA.
- Feltovich, Nick, 1999. "Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 1605-1632, September.
- Binmore, Ken, 1999. "Why Experiment in Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages F16-24, February.
- Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997.
"The Ratchet Principle in a Principal Agent Game with Unknown Costs: An Experimental Analysis,"
Departmental Working Papers
199608, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Chaudhuri, Ananish, 1998. "The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: an experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, November.
- Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003.
"Long Cheap Talk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
- repec:cor:louvrp:-636 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2001.
"Professionals Play Minimax,"
2001-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, March.
- Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Johannes Hörner & Julian Jamison, 2008. "Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 475-498.
- Zamir, Shmuel, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 109-154 Elsevier.
- Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.