Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
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- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Working Papers hal-01094061, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2015. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-01252950, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Francoise Forges, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Post-Print hal-01252953, HAL.
- Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
- Jérôme Renault, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 221-245.
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- Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
- Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 64-71.
- Shalev Jonathan, 1994. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 246-259, September.
- Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
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- Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2017. "Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 17, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- repec:eee:mateco:v:76:y:2018:i:c:p:52-61 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsCommitment; Cooperative solution; Joint plan equilibrium; Folk theorem; Private information;
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