On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals
We consider two-player repeated games with lack of information on one side: first, payoff matrices are chosen according to a known probability, and are only announced to one of the players called the informed player. Then, the game with the selected payoffs is infinitely repeated. We prove here the existence of a uniform equilibrium, in the case of imperfect monitoring where after each move the players receive some private, possibly random but state independent signal.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
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