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Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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  • Steven A. Matthews
  • M. Okuno-Fujiwara
  • Andrew Postlewaite

Abstract

Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:892r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
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