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On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games

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  • Steven A. Matthews
  • Andrew Postlewaite

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:992
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/992.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    3. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 17-40, October.
    4. Blume Andreas & Sobel Joel, 1995. "Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 359-382, April.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 1989. "Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 264-303, June.
    6. Seidmann, Daniel J., 1990. "Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 445-458, April.
    7. Blume Andreas, 1994. "Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 66-77, October.
    8. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    9. Steven A. Matthews, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-369.
    10. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
    11. Blume, A., 1992. "Equilibrium Refinement in Perturbed Games and in Sender- Receiver Games," Working Papers 92-13, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    12. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication," Working papers 386, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    13. Fran├žoise Forges, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-398.
    14. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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