Equilibrium Refinement in Sender-Receiver Games
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- Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier.
- Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008.
"Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
- Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," THEMA Working Papers 2006-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," Post-Print hal-00360739, HAL.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March.
- Blume, A., 1994.
"Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games : An Experiment,"
1994-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Blume, A. & De Jong, D.V. & Kim, Y.G. & Sprinkle, G.B., 1994. "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games: An Experiment," Papers 9491, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
- In-Uck Park, 2000. "Cheap Talk Reputation and Coordination of Differentiated Experts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1680, Econometric Society.
- Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2016. "Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 451, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Keywordsgame theory ; economic equilibrium;
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