Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria

Citations

Cited by:

1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
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   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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   • Andreas Blume, 1996. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9605004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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7. Gary Charness & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez & Matthias Sutter, 2023. "An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1530-1543, November.
   • Charness, Gary & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Sutter, Matthias, 2019. "An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games," IZA Discussion Papers 12347, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   • Gary Charness & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez & Matthias Sutter, 2019. "An experimental study on the effects of communication, credibility, and clustering in network games," CESifo Working Paper Series 7659, CESifo.
   • Gary Charness & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez & Matthias Sutter, 2019. "An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_08, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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    • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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29. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
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32. Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017. "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 147-161.
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