Growth Forecasts, Belief Manipulation and Capital Markets
We analyze how a benevolent, privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy's growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs. We model two types of agent: "conforming" and "dissenting." The former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency, whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency.We identify both informative and uninformative equilibria and demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can dominate the informative ones in terms of ex-post social welfare.
|Date of creation:||13 Sep 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies, Lund University School of Economics and Management, P.O. Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden|
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