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Blackwell's Ordering and Public Information


  • Colin M. Campbell

    () (Rutgers University)


We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (1971) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering.

Suggested Citation

  • Colin M. Campbell, 2002. "Blackwell's Ordering and Public Information," Departmental Working Papers 200206, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200206

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Hakansson, Nils H & Kunkel, J Gregory & Ohlson, James A, 1982. " Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Information to Have Social Value in Pure Exchange," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(5), pages 1169-1181, December.
    2. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 43-58, January.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    4. Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-358, March.
    5. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
    6. Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 373-390, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Piero Gottardi & Rohit Rahi, 2014. "Value Of Information In Competitive Economies With Incomplete Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 57-81, February.
    2. Lundtofte, Frederik & Leoni, Patrick, 2014. "Growth forecasts, belief manipulation and capital markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 108-125.
    3. Galanis, Spyros, 2016. "The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 1-18.
    4. Piergiuseppe Morone, 2004. "Investigating The Effects Of Information On Income Distribution Using Experimental Data," Experimental 0407005, EconWPA.
    5. Colin Campbell, 2004. "Implementation and orderings of public information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(1), pages 43-57, December.

    More about this item


    Blackwell's Ordering; Information; Risk Sharing;

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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