Implementation and Orderings of Public Information
We explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure, in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards, including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty.
|Date of creation:||07 Feb 2003|
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- Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003.
"Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 43-58, January.
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- Colin M. Campbell, 2002. "Blackwell's Ordering and Public Information," Departmental Working Papers 200206, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-358, March.
- Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
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