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Implementation and orderings of public information

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  • Colin Campbell

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Abstract

We explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure, in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards, including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Colin Campbell, 2004. "Implementation and orderings of public information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(1), pages 43-57, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2004:i:1:p:43-57 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-004-0119-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 43-58.
    2. Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-358, March.
    3. Campbell, Colin M., 2004. "Blackwell's ordering and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 179-197.
    4. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 509-524.
    5. Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 373-390.
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    Cited by:

    1. Galanis, Spyros, 2016. "The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 1-18.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; Blackwell’s ordering; information; risk sharing;

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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