Implementation and orderings of public information
We explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure, in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards, including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Volume (Year): 9 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003.
"Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 43-58, 01.
- Eckwert, B. & Zilcha, I., 1999. "Incomplete Risk Sharing Arrangements and the Value of Information," Papers 13-99, Tel Aviv.
- Colin M. Campbell, 2002.
"Blackwell's Ordering and Public Information,"
Departmental Working Papers
200206, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
- Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 373-390, June.
- Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-358, March.
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