IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement

  • Cramton, Peter C.
  • Palfrey, Thomas R.

In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players' beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two-stage process, consisting of a ratification stage followed by the actual play of the chosen game. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp731.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Victoria Mason)


Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 731.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Apr 1990
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:731
Contact details of provider: Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
Phone: 626 395-4065
Fax: 626 405-9841
Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss
Email:

Order Information: Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
  3. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  4. Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
  6. Caillaud, Bernard & Hermalin, B., 1989. "Role of outside considerations in the design of compensation schemes (the)," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8922, CEPREMAP.
  7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
  9. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
  10. Roberts, Kevin, 1985. "Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 401-13, June.
  11. Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Deneckere, Raymond J., 1989. "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 18-46, June.
  12. Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1991. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," Papers of Peter Cramton 90ier, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  13. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-35, July.
  14. Caillaud, Bernard & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1989. "the Role of Outside Considerations in the Design of Compensation Schemes," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6dw3p30z, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  15. Peter Cramton, 1985. "Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms," Papers of Peter Cramton 85roth, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  16. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  17. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
  18. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:731. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victoria Mason)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.