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A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental Planning

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  • Berthomé, Guy-El-Karim
  • Thomas, Alban

Abstract

The efficiency of participatory schemes in environmental planning is an emerging research area, and many issues are not solved yet regarding the assessment of such procedures. It is essential for decision makers to identify improvement opportunities of participatory schemes. We propose an original procedure to address such issue, through a bargaining model from the signaling game literature, which accounts for participation design as well as for agents' preferences, beliefs and bargaining power. The model is calibrated using qualitative data from surveys in French local communities involved in municipal solid waste management. Model simulations are used to test for assumptions on the stakeholder dialogue and explore sensitivity of game outcomes to structural parameters. We propose a set of performance indicators to identify the most effective participatory schemes in achieving convergence in stakeholder positions regarding environmental and land-use planning.

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  • Berthomé, Guy-El-Karim & Thomas, Alban, 2017. "A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental Planning," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 113-123.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:132:y:2017:i:c:p:113-123
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.10.014
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    2. Adhami, Maryam & Sadeghi, Seyed Hamidreza & Sheikhmohammady, Majid, 2018. "Making competent land use policy using a co-management framework," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 171-180.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Facility sitting; Public participation; Collaborative negotiation; Waste management; Nimby; Simulation model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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