Attention manipulation and information overload
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- Petra Persson, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," NBER Working Papers 23823, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Petra, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," CEPR Discussion Papers 12297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Petra, 2013. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," Working Paper Series 995, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Persson, Petra, 2018.
"Attention manipulation and information overload,"
Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 78-106, May.
- Persson, Petra, 2013. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," Working Paper Series 995, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Petra Persson, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," NBER Working Papers 23823, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Petra, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," CEPR Discussion Papers 12297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sergei Mikhalishchev, 2020. "Optimal Menu when Agents Make Mistakes," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp670, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- M38 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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