Competing with Equivocal Information
This paper studies strategic disclosure by multiple senders competing for prizes awarded by a single receiver. They decide whether to disclose a piece of information that is both verifiable and equivocal (it can inuence the receiver both ways). The standard unrav- eling argument breaks down: if the commonly known probability that her information is favorable is high, a single sender never discloses. Competition restores full disclosure only if some of the senders are sufficiently unlikely to have favorable information. When the senders are uncertain about each other's strength, however, all symmetric equilibria approach full disclosure as competition increases.
|Date of creation:||29 Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00675126|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathis, Jérôme, 2008.
"Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 571-584, November.
- Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion," THEMA Working Papers 2006-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
- Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2008.
"Information Gathering and Marketing,"
08-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- repec:pit:wpaper:453 is not listed on IDEAS
- Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
- Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky, 2009.
"A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation,"
NBER Working Papers
15237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006.
"On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
- David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson, 2004. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," Economics Series Working Papers 185, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Kyle Bagwell & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2005. "Look How Little I’m Advertising!," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Dziuda, Wioletta, 2011. "Strategic argumentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1362-1397, July.
- Wilson, Chris M., 2010. "Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 496-506, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00675126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.