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Eduardo Perez

Personal Details

First Name:Eduardo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Perez
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppe397
http://eduardo.perez.free.fr

Affiliation

Sciences économiques
Sciences Po

Paris, France
http://econ.sciences-po.fr/centers

:


RePEc:edi:ecspofr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bourles, Renaud & Bramoulle, Yann & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Altruism and Risk Sharing in Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2017. "Information Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2017. "Altruism in Networks," Post-Print hal-01590007, HAL.
  5. Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/17ekir5v8r8, Sciences Po.
  6. Eduardo Perez-Richet & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-00675135, HAL.
  7. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  9. Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/3e7u7h227p9, Sciences Po.
  10. Raphaël Godefroy & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2010. "Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00564976, HAL.

Articles

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  2. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2017. "Altruism in Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 675-689, March.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  4. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
  5. Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
  6. Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2011. "A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 15-17, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Competition over Cursed Consumers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7046, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Marvin Deversi & Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Spin Doctors: A Model and an Experimental Investigation of Vague Disclosure," CESifo Working Paper Series 7244, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2015. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 21099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Schwardmann, Peter & Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Competitive pricing and quality disclosure to cursed consumers," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145573, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Burkhard Schipper & Ying Xue Li, 2018. "Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment," Working Papers 111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Seda Ertac & Mert Gumren & Levent Kockesen, 2017. "Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1714, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.

  2. Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2017. "Information Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Artem Hulko & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Information Provision in a Sequential Search Setting," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.
    2. Artem Hulko & Mark Whitmeyer, 2017. "A Game of Random Variables," Papers 1712.08716, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2018.

  3. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2017. "Altruism in Networks," Post-Print hal-01590007, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Lionel Richefort, 2018. "Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1211-1238, November.
    2. Kenan Huremovic, 2019. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," Papers 1901.07605, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
    3. Genicot, Garance, 2016. "Two-sided altruism and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 92-97.
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2014. "Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem," Working Papers in Economics 603, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    5. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2017. "Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists," TSE Working Papers 17-833, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Victorien Barbet & Renaud Bourlès & Juliette Rouchier, 2017. "Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives: The Effect of Learning and Other-Regarding Preferences," Working Papers halshs-01480539, HAL.
    7. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2018. "Altruism and Risk Sharing in Networks," AMSE Working Papers 1838, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
    8. Bulat Sanditov & Saurabh Arora, 2015. "Social network and private provision of public goods," SPRU Working Paper Series 2015-35, SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School.
    9. Daske, Thomas, 2019. "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: "Gamification" and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints 193148, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    10. Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank, 2017. "Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    11. Cortes-Corrales, Sebastián & Gorny, Paul M., 2018. "Generalising Conflict Networks," MPRA Paper 90001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Courty, Pascal & Engineer, Merwan, 2017. "A Pure Hedonic Theory of Utility and Status: Unhappy but Efficient Invidious Comparisons," CEPR Discussion Papers 12478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Vesall Nourani & Christopher Barrett & Eleonora Patacchini & Thomas Walker, 2019. "Working Paper 313 - Altruism, Insurance, and Costly Solidarity Commitments," Working Paper Series 2439, African Development Bank.

  4. Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/17ekir5v8r8, Sciences Po.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    2. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    3. Dinev, Nikolay, 2017. "Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion," Economics Series 334, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    4. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    5. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
    6. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    7. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    8. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    9. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "On the value of persuasion by experts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58677, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. James Best & Daniel Quigley, 2016. "Persuasion for the Long-Run," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    11. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    12. Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
    13. Alonso, Ricardo & C�mara, Odilon, 2017. "On the Value of Persuasion by Experts," CEPR Discussion Papers 12482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    15. Glode, Vincent & Opp, Christian C. & Zhang, Xingtan, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 652-688.
    16. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Resisting Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 07-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

  5. Eduardo Perez-Richet & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-00675135, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    2. Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/17ekir5v8r8, Sciences Po.
    3. Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris, 2015. "False Advertising," TSE Working Papers 15-614, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2017.
    4. Aka, Joël, 2017. "Market approval of phytosanitary active substances in Europe: An empirical duration analysis," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 143-153.
    5. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
    6. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.

  6. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Simeon Schudy & Verena Utikal, 2015. "Does imperfect data privacy stop people from collecting personal health data?," TWI Research Paper Series 98, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    2. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    3. Eduardo Perez & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5mao0mthj59, Sciences Po.
    4. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    5. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.

  7. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
    2. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    3. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
    4. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    5. Shuo Liu & Dimitri Migrow, 2019. "Designing organizations in volatile markets," ECON - Working Papers 319, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 × 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Certification and Market Transparency," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2014-041, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    9. Debdatta Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2018. "Coordination and Private Information Revelation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(3), pages 1-21, September.
    10. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    12. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
    13. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    14. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    15. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    17. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Voting Rules," Working Papers 904, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    18. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
    19. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    20. Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 167-170.
    21. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    22. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
    23. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    24. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
    25. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    26. Seda Ertac & Mert Gumren & Levent Kockesen, 2017. "Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1714, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    27. Madhav Raghavan, 2018. "Influence in Private-Good Economies," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 18.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.

  8. Eduardo Perez, 2011. "A Note on the Tight Simplification of Mechanisms," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/3e7u7h227p9, Sciences Po.

    Cited by:

    1. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.

  9. Raphaël Godefroy & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2010. "Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00564976, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2017. "Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1477-1506, June.
    2. Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching," Sciences Po publications 2018-11, Sciences Po.
    3. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto, 2019. "When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 52-64.
    4. Boris Ginzburg & José-Alberto Guerra, 2017. "When Ignorance is Bliss: Theory and Experiment on Collective Learning," Documentos CEDE 015377, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
    5. Henry, Emeric & Louis-Sidois, Charles, 2015. "Voting and contributing when the group is watching," CEPR Discussion Papers 10912, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2017. "A Shut Mouth Catches No Flies: Consideration of Issues and Voting," Working Papers 973, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

Articles

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2017. "Altruism in Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 675-689, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2011. "A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 15-17, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2012-12-06 2018-06-11 2018-11-26 2019-01-07 2019-01-14. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2012-03-21 2012-03-21 2012-12-06. Author is listed
  3. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (3) 2018-11-26 2019-01-07 2019-01-14. Author is listed
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2012-03-21 2012-12-06 2017-04-30. Author is listed
  5. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (3) 2018-11-26 2019-01-07 2019-01-14. Author is listed
  6. NEP-NET: Network Economics (2) 2018-11-26 2019-01-14
  7. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2018-11-26 2019-01-14
  8. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (2) 2018-11-26 2019-01-14
  9. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2017-09-24
  10. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2018-06-11

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