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Report NEP-DES-2019-09-30
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Item repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé Iehlé, 2019, "Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01513384, Aug, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170115.
- Christopher Kah & Markus Walzl & Flip Klijn, 2019, "Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1115, Sep.
- T. Erber & M. J. Frank, 2019, "Arrow, Hausdorff, and Ambiguities in the Choice of Preferred States in Complex Systems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.07771, Sep.
- Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019, "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2019-15, Sep.
- Pascal Frömel, 2019, "An Auction-Based Perspective on Takeovers of Real Estate Investment Trusts," ERES, European Real Estate Society (ERES), number eres2019_217, Jan.