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Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume Haeringer

    (Zicklin School of Business - Baruch College [CUNY] - CUNY - City University of New York [New York])

  • Vincent Iehlé Iehlé

    (CREAM - Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

Abstract

In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45% of positions (and about 60% of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences," Post-Print halshs-01513384, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01513384
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170115
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01513384v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2010. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1860-1874, September.
    2. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS, 2016. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Stable Maximum Matchings," Cahiers de recherche 13-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    3. Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2012. "On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 588-600.
    4. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-427, March.
    5. Echenique, Federico & Pereyra, Juan Sebastián, 2016. "Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    6. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2010. "Enjeux stratégiques du concours de recrutement des enseignants-chercheurs," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(4), pages 697-721.
    7. Itai Ashlagi & Yash Kanoria & Jacob D. Leshno, 2017. "Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 69-98.
    8. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    9. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    10. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 153-171, January.
    11. Nikhil Agarwal, 2015. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 1939-1978, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2020. "The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 305-318.
    3. Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stable matchings; Hall's marriage theorem; French academic job market; Partial matching data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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