Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
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Other versions of this item:
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 708.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 653.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Nakamura, T., 2007. "Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
References listed on IDEAS
- Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2005.
"Stable matchings and preferences of couples,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 75-106, March.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 117, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2005.
"Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,"
Working Papers
261, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 708.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Nakamura, T., 2007. "Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 653.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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Keywords
matching; couples; weak responsiveness; stability;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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