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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Author

Listed:
  • Bettina Klaus

  • Flip Klijn

Abstract

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 653.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:653.05
    Note: There is a new paper based on this research It has numbet 708.07 in this series
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Nakamura, Toshifumi, 2009. "Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2227-2233, September.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 653.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 653.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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