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The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

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  • Dogan, Onur
  • Laffond, Gilbert
  • Lainé, Jean

Abstract

Abstract We extend the Shapley-Scarf model of markets for indivisible goods without money to the case where couples of agents have joint preferences over the set of allocations. We show that the domain of (weakly) lexicographic preferences is maximal (for inclusion) for the existence of Core allocations. This result also holds in the case where the set of agents is partitioned into non-empty coalitions with any size, as well as for the class of markets studied in Konishi et al. (2001), where individuals exchange several types of purely indivisible goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Dogan, Onur & Laffond, Gilbert & Lainé, Jean, 2011. "The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 60-67, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:60-67
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bird, Charles G., 1984. "Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 309-313.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 261, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    4. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó, 2007. "Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(3), pages 175-184, November.
    5. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
    6. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:45:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
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    1. repec:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1097-x is not listed on IDEAS

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