Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
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| Date of creation: | Oct 2004 |
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| Handle: | RePEc:bge:wpaper:156 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Phone: +34 93 542-1222 Fax: +34 93 542-1223 Web page: http://www.barcelonagse.euEmail: More information through EDIRC
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- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2005.
"Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
653.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 708.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Klaus Bettina & Klijn Flip & Nakamura Toshifumi, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2005. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 261, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2002.
"Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask),"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
552.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Oct 2005.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó, 2007. "Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 175-184, November.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó, 2003. "Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)," Working Papers 78, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 117, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999.
"The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,"
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- Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eiichi Miyagawa & Licun Xue, 2002.
"Random paths to stability in the roommate problem,"
Discussion Papers
0102-65, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun, 2004. "Random paths to stability in the roommate problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 18-28, July.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
- Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
- Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
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